

Manuel Staab

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Current Position

Post-Doctoral Fellow, Aix-Marseille School of Economics

-Research interests: game theory, behavioural economics, economics of networks

Research and Education

PhD in Economics, London School of Economics, 9/2013 – 7/2018

-Thesis: *Essays on peer effects in social groups and information misperception*

-Specializations/interests: microeconomic theory, economics of networks, and behavioural economics

-Advisors: Balázs Szentes and Francesco Nava

-Awards: LSE Economics Departmental Award (2013-15, 2017-18)

MRes Economics, London School of Economics, (2012-2013)

-with Distinction

MSc Economics, London School of Economics, (2011-2012)

-with Distinction

BSc Economics and Economic History, London School of Economics, (2008-2011)

-Lilian Knowles Prize

Work Experience

Senior Consultant, Game Theory and Procurement Consulting, TWS Partners, (2018 – 2020)

-Advising clients on market design in negotiations and procurement using insights from game theory, mechanism design and behavioural economics; duties include the design and implementation of structured negotiations and complex auction formats like multiproduct, multiunit auctions; direct involvement in sourcing projects with lifetime values between 150 million EUR and 1,500 million EUR

Graduate Teaching Assistant, London School of Economics, (2011-2013, 2016-2018)

-Teaching Assistant for *Microeconomic Principles* (EC202) and *Macroeconomic Principles* (EC210)

-Teaching Assistant for summer school course *Intermediate Microeconomics*

LSE Fellow in Economics, London School of Economics, (2013 - 2016)

-Teaching Assistant for MSc level course *Advanced Microeconomics* (EC487);

Lecturers: Erik Eyster and Leonardo Felli

-Teaching Assistant for MRes level course *Microeconomics* (EC441);

Lecturers: Balázs Szentes and Michele Piccione

Adjunct Instructor (Lecturer), Richmond, The American University, (2013 - 2017)

-Responsible for course design, content delivery and examination; courses taught (including the selection of topics, structuring of the syllabus as well as planning and delivery of lectures): Intermediate Microeconomics, Principles of Investment, Introduction to Microeconomics

Visiting Associate, Boston Consulting Group, (2010)

Conferences and Presentations

2021 European Workshop on Economic Theory (EWET)

2019 Birkbeck, University of London

2018 EEA Annual Congress

University of Fribourg

Game Theory and Management (GTM)

2014-17 LSE Theory Work in Progress Seminar

Research

The Formation of Social Groups under Status Concern

revise & resubmit at Journal of Economic Theory

I study the interaction of two forces in the formation of social groups: the preference for high quality peers and the desire for status among one's peers. I present a characterization of fundamental properties of equilibrium group structures in a perfect information, simultaneous move game when group membership is priced uniformly and cannot directly depend on type. While equilibrium groups generally exhibit some form of assortative matching between individual type and peer quality, the presence of status concern reduces the potential degree of sorting and acts as a force for greater homogeneity across groups. I analyze the effect of status concern for the provision of groups under different market structures and particularly focus on the implications for segregation and social exclusion. I find that status concern reduces the potential for and benefit from segregation - both for a social planner and a monopolist - but the interaction of preference for rank and status can make the exclusion of some agents a second-best outcome.

The Benefits of Being Misinformed (joint with Marcus Roel)

revise & resubmit at Journal of the European Economic Association

In the spirit of Blackwell (1951), we analyze how two fundamental mistakes in information processing - incorrect beliefs about the world and misperception of information - affect the expected utility ranking of information experiments. We explore their individual and combined influence on welfare and provide necessary and sufficient conditions when mistakes alter and possibly reverse the ranking of information experiments. Both mistakes by themselves reduce welfare in a model where payoff relevant actions also generate informative signals. This is true for naive decision-makers, unaware of any errors, as well as for sophisticated decision-makers, who account for the possibility of mistakes. However, mistakes can interact in non-obvious ways and an agent might be better off suffering from both, rather than just one. We provide a characterization when such positive interactions are possible. Surprisingly, this holds true only for naive decision-makers and thus naivete can be beneficial. We discuss implications for information acquisition and avoidance, welfare-improving belief manipulation, and policy interventions in general.

The Evolution of Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games

This paper analyses how preferences over consumption rank and risk-taking behaviour can emerge as an evolutionary stable equilibrium when agents face an (anti-)coordination task. If information about relative consumption is available, this cannot be ignored, and evolutionary stable strategies are determined by consumption rank. This suggests status preferences to be salient in settings where miscoordination is particularly costly.

Work in progress:

Optimal sharing in social dilemmas

joint with Maria Kleshnina, Valentin Huebner, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee

Being categorical or flexible? Decision-making rules that facilitate cooperation

joint with Maria Kleshnina, Kerstin Grosch, and Krishnendu Chatterjee

Optimal contributions in asymmetric public goods games

joint with Valentin Huebner, Maria Kleshnina, Christian Hilbe, and Krishnendu Chatterjee